The paper describes quality/price equilibrium and welfare e¤ects of R&D spillovers when …rms are located around the circumference of a Salop (1979) circle and the extent of the spillover may depend on the geographic proximity between …rms. In particular, in contrast to previous related contributions that studied the relationship between spatial competition and quality provision, we show that an increase in competition (i.e. additional entry on the circle) may have a positive e¤ect on the provision of quality and …rms'pro…ts. We also extend the model allowing a multinational enterprise, MNE, to locate at the centre of the circle. In this scenario it is important to understand the interplay of local R&D spillovers with spillovers that propagate from and to the centre.
Introduction
We study a model that provides insights to markets where …rms'entry/location decisions may a¤ect the extent of R&D spillovers and may de…ne the way competition a¤ects consumers and e¢ ciency. For example AstraZeneca, a pharmaceutical giant historically based in the North West of England, has recently announced 1 plans of a £ 330m investment to relocate global headquarters to Cambridge. The choice has been motivated by the intention of exploiting the existence of a bioscience hotspot in Cambridge 2 . It is not clear however what the e¤ects of the relocation will be in terms of the quality of the innovation process, study of new compounds and social welfare.
The paper contributes to two strands of literature; one that studies relationship between quality provision and competition, and one that studies the e¤ects of the existence of R&D spillovers in international markets where multinational enterprises, MNEs, decide to decentralize their R&D activities.
The …rst question (related to the …rst strand of literature) that we try to answer is whether an increase in …rms'density and competition has a positive e¤ect on the provision of quality and in turn social welfare in the presence of R&D spillovers increasing in the geographic proximity among …rms. The economic literature o¤ers already a number of contributions 3 that consider spatial competition in prices and quality. Two papers in particular are closely related to ours.
Assuming linear utility functions and cost separability between quality and output Economides (1993) shows that an increase in the number of …rms competing on a Salop circle has a negative e¤ect of quality provision. Intuitively an increase in the number of competitors has a negative e¤ect on demands and prices and in turn on quality provision. Interestingly Brekke et al. (2010) extended Economides (1993) framework to include income e¤ects (i.e. the possibility that consumers'utility may be concave in the numeraire good) and cost substitutability between output and quality production. The authors show that with a su¢ ciently high degree of cost substitutability in production an increase in the number of …rms would lower individual …rms'demands (this is standard) but, for a su¢ cient degree of cost substitutability, this translates into lower costs for quality and therefore higher investments 4 . In our paper we provide another argument in favour of a positive relationship between competition and quality provision. In the presence of R&D spillovers that depend on …rms'geographic proximity, quality may increase with spatial competition even if income e¤ects in utility and cost substitutability in production were not assumed.
Speci…cally in this paper we study the e¤ects that R&D spillovers may have on an oligopolistic market represented by a Salop (1979) circle. The model is a natural extension of the Hotelling (1929) duopoly described in Piga and 2 The company will locate in a biomedical campus and will share facilitites with other industry key players, including academic research centres, clinics and other commercial organisations such as GlaxoSmithKline (the largest pharmaceutical company in UK). This means that the two largests producers in UK will share the same location. See http://cambridgebiomedical.com/about-the-campus-2/occupiers/ 3 See for example Ma and Burgess (1993) and Gravelle (1999) . In both papers transportation costs are a measure of competition and a negative relationship is found between quality and competition. Lower transportation costs produce lower prices and in turn lower investments in quality. Other contributions (with a particular focus on the provision of secondary health care) consider quality investments in models of spatial competion with regulated prices. Quality is the only competitive instrument in the hands of …rms and not surprisingly a positive relationship between competition and quality is found. See for example Calem and Rizzo (1995) , Brekke et al. (2006 Brekke et al. ( ), (2007 . 4 The result is further strengthened if decreasing marginal utility of income is assumed. Poyago-Theotoky (2005) , PPT from now on, where R&D spillovers (of the nature described in Kamien et al. (1992) ) are favoured by geographic proximity. In our model the pro…tability of …rms and consequently their strategic conduct in terms of R&D investments and prices strongly depend on the number of …rms active in the market and the extent of the spillover. The additional entry of a competitor has standard e¤ects, such as an increase of the competitive pressure in the market (connected to the well-known business stealing e¤ect), a positive e¤ect on consumer surplus due to the average reduction in transportation costs and a negative e¤ect on quality investments (as reported in Economides (1993) ). However our model introduces another e¤ect of entry, i.e. the increase in the degree of R&D spillovers due to the increase in proximity and the consequent e¤ects on average quality. We show that an increase in competitive pressure (measured by the number of …rms on the circle) has a negative e¤ect on individual R&D investments. However, for su¢ ciently strong density-dependent spillovers, entry may translate into an increase in the aggregate quality e¤ectively provided to consumers. These two results (i.e. lower individual investments and higher quality experienced by consumers) produce that interesting result that pro…ts may increase if competition increases. We also show that the equilibrium R&D investment of …rms may be socially insu¢ cient.
The second question that we try to answer is related to the literature that studies the geographic dispersion of MNEs in the presence of R&D spillovers. In many industries (think for example of global players in software and broadcasting industries such as Microsoft and Sky) local …rms face competition from a global competitor. While the local …rms tend to be horizontally di¤erentiated in the eyes of consumers (in the sense that consumers tend to have preferred brands), a global competitor owns a brand that all consumers may value in the same way. In other words the product/service of the global …rm, even if it may be vertically superior to the local alternatives, it is not a neighboring competitor in the product space to any particular local …rm, but to all …rms simultaneously. We allow a …rm to locate at the centre of the circle and simultaneously compete against all other …rms located on the circumference. This scenario would describe the e¤ects that a global competitor would produce on an oligopolistic market with R&D spillovers.
Our model contributes to the growing literature that, moving in part away from traditional motives of MNEs' decentralization such as demand (better knowing the preferences of local customers) and supply (better employ local skills) oriented reasons, sees in geographic dispersion a source of knowledge for MNEs. In other words, choosing to decentralize R&D to subsidiaries, MNEs can acquire knowledge from local competitors thanks to existence of R&D spillovers. Of course, spillovers may play in both directions (from and to the local …rms), e¤ectively playing an important role in the de…nition of MNEs' boundaries (see Petit and Sanna-Randaccio (2000) and Sanna-Randaccio and Veugelers (2007) ) and their internationalization strategies (e.g. the choice between exports, FDI and licensing) (see Ethier and Markusen (1996) , Siotis (1999) and Fosfuri (2000) ). The contributions in this literature often consider a two-country two-…rm models, under a non-address approach framework. The model that we present in this paper contributes to this literature in three ways. First we employ the address approach, where each …rm on the circle competes directly with only two neighbouring …rms. Second, thanks to symmetry provided by the Salop (1979) set up, we can study oligopolistic competition between one MNE …rm and n local …rms, that compete strategically in R&D and prices for the local market. Finally, we consider the realistic possibility of the existence of local R&D spillovers, i.e. knowledge leakage between (neighbouring) local competitors on the circle and we study how such spillovers may a¤ect the relationship between competition and quality provision. We show that in the extended scenario with a MNE competition can again have a positive e¤ect on quality, both at the centre and on the circumpherence and, eventually, on social welfare.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section two we describe the basic model and derive the equilibrium when …rms located on a Salop circle experience R&D spillovers produced by the investments of the neighboring competitors. In section three we extend the model allowing a …rm to locate at the centre of the circle. Section four concludes.
The model
The market is represented by a circle of length equal to one. A unit mass of consumers demanding inelastically one unit of a homogeneous good is uniformly distributed around the circumference of the circle, along which n 3 identical …rms are symmetrically located. The utility of a generic consumer buying from …rm i 2 f1; 2; :::; ng is given by
where v > 0 is consumers'reservation price (assumed to be su¢ ciently large to guarantee full market coverage in equilibrium); Q i is a measure of the quality of good i, which coincides with …rm's i total innovation technology (speci…ed below); p i is the price of good i; t > 0 is the transportation cost parameter and x 0 represents the distance between the consumer and …rm i's location. The pro…ts of the generic …rm i are:
where D i is the demand of …rm i, q i represents the investment in R&D of …rm i and is a measure of the …rm's ine¢ ciency to innovate. Firm i's demand is:
where subscripts i 1 and i + 1 are assigned to values, respectively, of the counterclockwise and clockwise neighbor of …rm i.
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The innovation technology to …rm i, inclusive of the spillover externalities, is given by:
where 2 [0; 1] represents the R&D spillover parameter and the sequence of positive real numbers g(n) models how R&D spillovers fade with the distance between …rms. It is natural to assume that g(n) is increasing in n (i.e. the lower the distance, the higher the spillover 6 ), with sup n g(n) = 1. We are considering the simple case in which the innovative e¤ort of a …rm is reinforced by the R&D investments of the neighboring …rms. Thus, the extent of the spillovers depends on the parameter (related for example to the particular market and product provided) and (similar to PPT) to the distance between two neighboring …rms. The entry of an additional …rm in the market reduces the distance between …rms and creates two e¤ects. On one hand, it increases the competitive pressure (it is easier for consumers to switch to another provider) in the market and, on the other, increases the extent of R&D spillovers.
Let us assume that …rms target own pro…t maximization and choose simultaneously and non-cooperatively R&D investments and prices. Let us restrict our attention to the parameter subset S (t; ; n; ) 2 R 4 s.t. 2t > 4 (1 g (n) ) . Parameters belonging to S ensure that Second Order Conditions for pro…t maximization and non-undercutting condition (i.e. no …rm will …nd pro…table to increase R&D investment and lower price to the point of undercutting the neighboring rivals) are satis…ed.
The unique symmetric (p i = p , q i = q , i 2 f1; 2; :::; ng) equilibrium is:
. In equilibrium pro…ts are given by:
the latter is obtained by considering the utility of a consumer who is indi¤erent between buying from …rm i or …rm i + 1. This consumer is located at x i+1 , which solves the equation
. 6 A simple particular speci…cation might be for example g(n) = 1
Social welfare is given by the sum of producers'surplus (n ) and consumers' surplus 7 (2n
Propositions 1-3 provide our …rst set of results.
Proposition 1 In equilibrium an increase in n has a negative e¤ ect on prices and individual …rm R&D investment, q (i.e. dq dn < 0). E¤ ective quality perceived by consumers may however increase (i.e.
(1 4 g(n)) ). The e¤ ect of an increase in n on welfare depends on the sign and strength of dQ dn . In particular
If an additional …rm enters the market, prices and market shares decrease (business stealing e¤ ect). The increase in n has however an additional e¤ect compared to the standard Salop model without R&D: since …rms are more closely located, the extent of R&D spillovers increases. This has a negative e¤ect on …rms'willingness to invest in R&D, i.e. q decreases and, if the extent of the spillover strongly increases with n (high g 0 ), interestingly in aggregate this may also translate into higher pro…ts (due to lower costs) and an increase of the aggregate quality perceived by consumers. The e¤ect of an increase in n on welfare is ambiguous. Additional entry has both a (double) positive e¤ect on welfare (i.e. it decreases aggregate transportation costs and, due to R&D spillovers, …rms spend less in innovation) and a potentially negative e¤ect (i.e. lower quality provided to consumers). Consequently the nature of the spillover propagation plays a key role. If the spillover e¤ect is su¢ ciently large to ensure that aggregate quality does not decrease and the increase in proximity has a su¢ ciently strong e¤ect on the spillover (g 0 (n) su¢ ciently large), competition may have a positive e¤ect on welfare, especially if …rms are ine¢ cient, i.e. high . Without the existence of income e¤ects or cost substitutability in quality and quantity, we have shown that standard results in previous literature can be reversed if the strength of R&D spillovers depends on …rms'density in the market. 7 In the symmetric equilibrium …rms share equally the market, each …rm covers a 1 n portion of the circle. The endpoints of the interval of integration represent half (say the portion of the right side) the market share of a generic …rm, for example the one located at 0.
Proposition 2 In equilibrium an increase in t has no e¤ ect on quality, a positive e¤ ect on prices and pro…ts and a negative e¤ ect on welfare.
The fact that more competitive pressure represented by a decrease in transportation cost t may have a negative e¤ect on prices and pro…ts is clearly not surprising and in line with the …ndings in Economides (1993) .
Proposition 3
In equilibrium an increase in the spillover parameter has a positive e¤ ect on pro…ts and a negative e¤ ect on q and Q. When spillovers are small, an increase in spillovers may have a positive e¤ ect on social welfare (that is
If increases, …rms have a lower incentive to invest in R&D and the savings in costs have a positive e¤ect on pro…ts. These savings of course translate into lower quality for consumers and eventually, for su¢ ciently high spillovers, into lower social welfare.
Spillovers from a global competitor
In this section we consider competition between a MNE (i.e. a brand that all consumers may value in the same way) and horizontally di¤erentiated local …rms. The product/service of the MNE, even if it may be vertically superior to the local alternatives, it is not a neighboring competitor in the product space to any particular local …rm, but to all local …rms simultaneously.
A way to introduce this type of global Vs local competition in the Salop framework is to assume that the global competitor, say …rm c, locates at the centre 8 of the circle and all consumers have to incur the same (regardless of their location on the circle) transportation cost 0 to buy from c. We want to study how the decision of a MNE to enter a market with a subsidiary able to exploit knowledge spillovers due to proximity with local competitors may a¤ect competition and quality provision. Indeed in such a scenario R&D spillovers do not propagate only among local …rms (as we discussed in Section 2), but may also originate from the MNE to spread equally to the local competitors; in addition, entering the local market, the MNE may absorb in part the knowledge of the local competitors.
Suppose that the R&D spillovers propagate in the following way:
8 Madden and Pezzino (2011) study the Salop model with competition from the centre. Their focus however is the study of …rms'long run entry decisions and the social desirability of global competition. Our objective here is instead to consider R&D competition and the e¤ects of spillovers in a Salop model with centre.
where Q i is the quality of …rm i, q i is the individual investment in R&D of …rm i, i = 1; ::; n, q c is the R&D investment of the central …rm. 1 ; 2 ; 3 2 (0; 1) are the R&D spillover parameters. 1 is the parameter that describes spillovers among local …rms. Similar to the analysis of Section 2, we assume that local spillovers also depend on the proximity of …rms according to the expression 9 1 1 n . 2 and 3 are the parameters that represent respectively the R&D spillover from the centre to the periphery and vice versa. The way spillovers propagate in (6) seems natural for many markets. When a MNE enters a market with a subsidiary, all local …rms are in direct competition for consumers with the global …rm. This competitive interaction between the local …rms and the MNE may be a source of the R&D spillovers described in (6). The MNE can exploit knowledge spillovers from the local …rms, that in turn experience local R&D spillovers with the neighboring competitors. At the same time, however, since the MNE has entered the local market, the local …rms can also take advantage of knowledge leaks from the MNE 10 . To simplify the analysis and make the model tractable we assume that t = 1 and 2 ; 3 2 f0; 1 g.
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Consumers located further away from two neighboring …rms on the circle may consider to buy from the central …rm. If all the n + 1 …rms have a positive market share, then the demands are given by
where x = pc pi+Qi Qc+ t is the location of the marginal consumer indi¤erent to buy from …rm i on the circumference or …rm c. In what follows we shall restrict our attention to parameter subset 12 that allow both types of …rms to be active in equilibrium 13 , i.e. x 2 0; 1 2n , equilibrium prices, quantities and pro…ts are strictly positive and no …rm has the incentive to deviate undercutting the rivals.
The pro…t function of the local …rms is still given by (2). The central …rm targets the maximization of 14 :
9 The extension of the model that we are describing here is signi…cantly more complex compared to the case without a central …rm. Choosing to focus on the case 1 1 n ensures tractibility, unfortunately at the expense of generality.
1 0 Of course, the MNE may also have the option to keep R&D activities in the HQ. However in this paper we are considering the case in which competitive interaction (and proximity) are the two key ingredients that allow technological spillovers, for example, due to reverse engineering or imitation. In this sense, simply exporting to the foreign country the MNE may not able to avoid spillovers to local …rms (i.e. 2 > 0).
1 1 In our framework 1 can be interpreted as the degree of patent protection in a particular country.
1 2 In the Appendix we describe in detail the conditions that produce the parameter space. 1 3 See Madden and Pezzino (2011) for the description of scenarios where the condition is not satis…ed.
1 4 The fact that the MNE and the local …rms access the same technology, i.e. the same quality-dependent cost function, simpli…es the analysis and allows us to focus our attention to the role played by R&D spillovers in equilibrium.
Similar to the case considered in Section 2, let us consider the game in which the n + 1 …rms simultaneously set their investments in R&D and choose prices. The equilibrium with R&D decentralization is:
where q i = q , p i = p , i = 1; :::; n.
Before providing the main results of this section, let us de…ne the social welfare function and a measure of the average quality in the market. The welfare function with an active central …rm in a symmetric equilibrium is given by the sum of producers'surplus (n(pD 
where D i = D, i = 1; :::; n, and D c = 1 n D are …rms' market shares in equilibrium. Average quality is given by
Proposition 4 -6 describe the e¤ect of an increase in competition.
Proposition 4
In equilibrium an increase in n has always a negative e¤ ect on the individual investment in R&D of the local …rms, dq dn < 0. The e¤ ect on MNE's investment and all qualities is ambiguous,
Proposition 5 In equilibrium an increase in n has a negative e¤ ect on the pro…ts of all …rms in the market.
Proposition 6 An increase in n has an ambiguous e¤ ect on social welfare.
The decision of the MNE to enter the market e¤ectively creates two additional sources of knowledge spillovers. Fiercer competition induces local …rms to reduce their investment in R&D (this is standard and intuitive), but the local spillovers may be enough to ensure that in aggregate quality provided by the local …rms may increase. In contrast to the case reported in Proposition 1, the reduction in quality-dependent costs is not enough now to guarantee an increase in the pro…ts of the local …rms. Due to an increase in n, the MNE faces lower quality investments from local …rms. However, thanks to the existence of spillovers, even if …rms may decide to invest less in R&D, quality in equilibrium may increase, reducing pro…tability for all …rms. In aggregate the e¤ect of an increase in competition may be positive. Consumer surplus may increase (due to higher qualities) and more than o¤set the decrease in pro…ts, with positive e¤ects on welfare.
Proposition 7
In equilibrium an increase in the local spillover parameter 1 has a negative e¤ ect on the individual investment of all …rms in the market. The quality and pro…ts of the local …rms increase with 1 , whereas the quality and pro…ts of the MNE decrease. Welfare e¤ ects are ambiguous.
Proposition 8
In equilibrium an increase in 2 has a positive (negative) e¤ ect on the quality investment of the local (MNE) …rms. The quality of local …rms may increase, but the quality of MNE decreases, and so does average quality in the market. Pro…ts of the local …rms increase, but the e¤ ect of MNE's pro…ts is ambiguous. In aggregate the negative e¤ ect on quality prevails and welfare decreases with 2 . The e¤ ect of an increase in 3 are mostly ambiguous and depend on the speci…c values of the parameters.
Similar to the results in Proposition 3, an increase in the local R&D spillover parameter 15 has a negative e¤ect on local …rms'investment in quality that, saving in costs, may earn higher pro…ts. Nonetheless, in contrast to the results reported in Section 2, now local quality increases. Not surprisingly, an increase in 1 puts the local …rms at a competitive advantage and, ceteris paribus, the MNE reacts lowering quality and earning lower pro…ts. The increase in 1 has an ambiguous e¤ect on welfare. In particular, since the reduction in central investment in quality may have a negative e¤ect on average quality. The decrease in average quality (accompanied by lower pro…ts for MNE) may have in turn a negative e¤ect on welfare. Interestingly, if the ability of the local …rms to extract knowledge from the MNE increases (i.e. higher 2 ), the local economy tends to be worse o¤. Local …rms, clearly, are better o¤, but at the same time consumers are provided with lower quality and in aggreate social welfare decreases. This result seems to produce a very important caveat to a standard line of reasoning in favour of globalization and competition from multinational enterprises. Even if local …rms indeed gain from global competition, it is essential to understand whether the whole economy (and in particular consumers) can bene…t from competition from a global competitor.
1 5 Notice that we are calculating the e¤ects on the equilibrium epressions of an increase in 1 , evaluated at 1 = 2 = 3 = .
Proposition 9 In equilibrium an increase in has a positive (negative) e¤ ect on the individual investment of the local (central) …rms. The pro…ts of the local …rms increase with , whereas the quality and pro…ts of the MNE decrease. The e¤ ects on the quality of the local …rms and social welfare are respectively ambiguous and negative.
Parameter is a measure of the mismatch between consumers'preferences and the characteristics of the good provided by the MNE. It can be interpreted also as local consumers' attitude towards a multinational, global brand. For a given t > 0, can be interpreted also as measure of vertical di¤erentiation between global and local brands. In particular notice that if ! 0, then the MNE is producing a vertically superior good compared to the local alternatives. An increase in clearly puts the MNE at a competitive disadvantage. It is not surprising then that local …rms react to an increase in increasing quality investments and earn higher pro…ts. The MNE instead reacts lowering quality investments. The aggregate e¤ect on quality provided by local …rms is however ambiguous and it depends on the interplay between local and global spillovers. Average quality and social welfare decrease unambiguously with . An interesting consequence of this result is that some campaigns against multinational brands 16 may produce negative e¤ects for consumers (i.e. lower quality) and local welfare.
The propositions above describe how the pro…ts of the MNE change with the parameters of the model. If the MNE is entering the market incurring, as it would be realistic, …xed costs (e.g. setting up factories and labs, hiring new sta¤, security, etc.) it is then worth to investigate what factors may favor entry of a global …rm. We have seen that a more competitive market is a less pro…table environment for the MNE, in particular if local …rms are able to exploit spillovers among each other (higher 1 together with higher proximity). Not surprisingly, a market where consumers experience a signi…cant mismatch with the MNE's product, i.e. high , is less pro…table for the MNE.
Conclusions
We studied quality/price competition in an oligopolistic market represented by a Salop circle with R&D spillovers. In particular we considered the existence of spillovers that depend on the density of …rms active in the market. We showed that an increase in the degree of competition (i.e. an increase in the number of …rms) may have ambiguous e¤ects in the terms of quality provided and social welfare. The existence and particular nature of R&D spillovers, increasing in the number of …rms active in a market, play an important role in the way …rms react to an increase in competition. Interestingly, it may be possible that an increase in competition can indeed produce an increase in quality provided (in contrast to Economides (1993) ), pro…ts (in contrast to standard economic intuition) and welfare (in contrast to the standard Salop (1979) model).
In addition we extended the model in order to study the role played by R&D spillovers in a market where a MNE competes with n local …rms. We showed that the positive relationship between competition and quality survives also in this scenario, even if …rms are not better o¤ now if competition becomes …ercer. Whether a MNE may …nd pro…table to enter a market where R&D spillovers are possible depends on the degree of local competition. In particular, we observed that a more competitive market may prevent a MNE to enter the local market.
The model provides interesting paths for further research. It would be worthwhile to study the out-of-equilibrium adjustment of price/quality choice over time, both under full best reply and gradient-like dynamics (see for example Bischi and Naimzada (2000) and Bischi and Lamantia (2002) ). In addition, it would be interesting to study the endogenous formation of R&D networks, for example allowing …rms on the circle to create connections (i.e. joint ventures) with competitors other than the neighbors.
